Asset demand tests for Expected Utility have almost universally been implemented in contingent claim settings where markets are complete. However when markets are incomplete, these tests cannot be applied since contingent claim prices cannot be uniquely recovered from given asset prices and the asset demand problem cannot be reduced to an equivalent contingent claim problem. Our key innovation is to show that by allowing not just asset prices but also probabilities to vary, it is possible to construct contingent claim prices that support contingent claim demand resulting from the maximization of Expected Utility. Complete market functional form and local demand tests can then be extended to incomplete markets.
Introduction
Suppose one wants to test whether a given collection of asset demand functions were generated by maximization of Expected Utility preferences. Assume the classic single period contingent claim setting where state probabilities are …xed. Then if asset markets are complete it is possible to apply the functional form test of Dybvig (1983) and a modi…ed form of the additive separability local demand test of Goldman and Uzawa (1964) to determine if the demands came from Expected Utility maximization. However if markets are incomplete, contingent claim prices cannot be uniquely recovered from given asset prices and the asset demand problem can no longer be reduced to an equivalent contingent claim problem. This would seem to be an immediate obstacle to applying the existing tests.
In this paper we show that if one makes the a priori reasonable assumption that when asset prices change state probabilities can also change, then it becomes possible to extend complete market tests for Expected Utility to incomplete markets. We build on the complete markets functional form and local demand tests in Kubler, Selden and Wei (2014) . The key new insight is that by allowing both asset prices and state probabilities to vary together, it is possible to use this new information on how asset prices vary with probabilities to pin down a vector of contingent claim prices (as functions of asset prices, probabilities and income) that supports the contingent claim demands generated by the maximization of Expected Utility. One can then augment the complete markets functional form and local demand tests to achieve the extension to incomplete markets. In addition to proving that the complete markets necessary and su¢ cient conditions can be extended, we provide a comprehensive example which illustrates the application of our new results.
In recent years there has been a signi…cant increase in interest in developing and then implementing in a laboratory environment asset demand tests for Expected Utility preferences. In most cases, these models are based on the classic contingent claim setting, where one is given demands and prices and a …xed set of probabilities. Markets are typically assumed to be complete, where the number of assets and states of nature are the same. Many of these tests include revealed preference conditions. 1 Because asset markets are complete, one can readily convert a set of asset demands and prices into an equivalent set of contingent claim demands and prices and the tests can be applied to contingent claim demands and 1 Revealed preference restrictions in a contingent claim setting have been developed by Green and Srivastava (1986) , Kubler, Selden and Wei (2014) and Polisson, Quah and Renou (2015) . Laboratory tests are considered in Choi, et al. (2007a Choi, et al. ( , 2007b and Polisson, Quah and Renou (2015) .
prices. Although it has long been recognized that it is more reasonable to assume that there are more states than assets and markets are incomplete, surprisingly little work has been done on understanding the nature of asset demands in this setting. 2 To illustrate this point, we consider two concrete incomplete market asset demand functions expressed in terms of asset prices, state probabilities and income (the interested reader can see eqns. (10) and (11) in Example 1 below.) Although the functions are homogeneous of degree zero in prices and probabilities and are proportional in income, we strongly suspect that the reader (like us) would …nd it almost impossible to guess (i) whether these demands might have come from a utility maximization, (ii) whether they are consistent with Expected Utility maximization and (iii) what speci…c form the Expected Utility might take. Quite surprising, it will be seen that the rationalizing complete market contingent claim utility is indeed a quite familiar form. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces notation and the asset optimization problem. In Section 3, we …rst adapt the Expected Utility functional form test from Kubler, Selden and Wei (2014) to the incomplete market setting. We then give our primary result enabling us to construct a unique candidate contingent claim price vector from observed asset prices, probabilities and demands. These are candidate prices in the sense that they support the demands resulting from the maximization of expected utility but might not be valid state prices if demand is not derived from Expected Utility maximization. In Section 4, we derive local conditions involving components of the Slutsky matrix which are necessary and su¢ cient for asset demands to be rationalized by an Expected Utility function in incomplete markets.
We assume throughout that the payo¤s of the J assets across states, ( j1 ; : : : ; jS ), are linearly independent for all j = 1; : : : ; J. We assume also that asset prices preclude arbitrage in that there are p s > 0; s = 1; : : : ; S such that
js p s (j = 1; 2; ; :::; J) :
In this paper we focus on the case where U takes the state independent Expected Utility form
where 2 R S ++ is a probability vector. It should be noted that in our setting, the probabilities are allowed to vary. This is di¤erent from the traditional Arrow-Debreu setting, where probabilities are assumed to be given and …xed. This key di¤erence enables us to change probabilities to gain more information in the following analysis.
We investigate what restrictions the assumption of state independent Expected Utility imposes on the solution to the maximization problem (1) as a function of asset prices, probabilities and incomes. We observe the demand function z(q; ; I), where the open sets of no-arbitrage asset prices, probabilities and incomes are denoted respectively by Q R J + , R S ++ and I R ++ . These demands are assumed to be globally invertible and continuously di¤erentiable. It is not necessary to normalize probabilities, and since we consider derivatives with respect to probabilities it will prove convenient not to do so. We therefore assume that probabilities lie in the strictly positive S dimensional orthant. Note that if demand is derived from the Expected Utility function (3), it is homogeneous of degree zero in .
3 Functional Form Test Varian (1983) showed that in revealed preference analyses, the Afriat inequalities for asset demands can be used to test whether asset demand and price observations are consistent with the maximization of an Expected Utility representation in an incomplete market setting. Green and Srivastava (1986) had the insight in their revealed preference analysis involving assets and contingent claims to simply require that there exist contingent claim prices which are consistent with the no-arbitrage relation and satisfy the standard Afriat inequalities for the observed contingent claim demands. We apply this insight to the complete markets functional form demand test derived in Kubler, Selden and Wei (2014) . To do so, we postulate the existence of a function that maps asset prices to contingent claim prices. However without the speci…c price function, it is not possible to actually implement the functional form test since it requires speci…cation of the contingent claim prices. We …rst give an example to illustrate this dilemma and then provide our new result for deriving the price function. We then revisit the example to show how this price function enables one to verify that the functional form test is in fact satis…ed.
Deriving the Test
The key to applying the ideas of Varian and of Green and Srivastava to a continuous setting is to postulate the existence of a function, p :
that maps asset prices to contingent claim prices. This allows us to de…ne the contingent claim demand for all (q; ; I) 2 Q I as
Note that this function "should" coincide with the extended contingent claim demand function x s : R S ++ Q I ! R + (s = 1; 2; :::; S), de…ned as
on the range of the function p in R S ++ . Adapting Theorem 2 in Kubler, Selden and Wei (2014) to the current incomplete market setting, we have the following.
Proposition 1 Assume that S > 2. Asset demand z(q; ; I), with P J j=1 js z j > 0 8s = 1; :::; S, can be rationalized by a state independent Expected Utility function as de…ned in eqn. (3) if and only if there is a continuously di¤erentiable price function p satisfying
as well as a twice continuously di¤erentiable function f : R 2 ++ ! R ++ such that for all (q; ; I) 2 Q I the contingent claim demand (4) derived from asset demand, satis…es x s = f (x 1 ; k s ), where k s is de…ned by
and f (x 1 ; k s ) is strictly increasing in k s and f (x; 1) = x for all x, and the extended contingent claim demands x s (s = 1; 2; :::; S) derived from the set of equations
and
satisfy Slutsky symmetry and negative semide…niteness.
There are two di¤erences between Proposition 1 and Theorem 2 in Kubler, Selden and Wei (2014) . First in Proposition 1, we postulate the existence of a function that maps asset prices to contingent state prices, thereby we restrict contingent claim prices, state probabilities and incomes to some subspace of the full parameter space. However since the proof of Theorem 2 never uses the price derivative, the contingent claim price dependence issue discussed in Remark 1 below does not a¤ect the proof. Second in the proof of Theorem 2, it is implicitly assumed that the demands can be rationalized by a strictly increasing and quasiconcave utility function. In Proposition 1, we only need to verify that the contingent claim demands (derived from asset demands) pass the demand restriction x s = f (x 1 ; k s ) on the restricted set of prices constructed from Theorem 1 below. Once the demands derived from eqns. (7) and (8), which correspond to the extended demands x(p; ; I) satisfy Slutsky symmetry and negative semide…-niteness, the contingent claim demands can be rationalized by a strictly increasing and quasiconcave utility function and thus the presumption in the proof of Theorem 2 is satis…ed. Otherwise, the proof of Proposition 1 is analogous to the proof of Theorem 2.
Candidate Contingent Claim Prices
As we next show, unfortunately the price function p assumed to exist in Proposition 1 is generally impossible to …nd in practice without additional information.
Example 1 Assume two assets and three states, with asset payo¤s 11 = 1; 12 = 0; 13 = 1 2 ; 21 = 0; 22 = 1; 23 = 1 2 ;
and asset demands are given by
(11) Using (9), it is easy to derive the following relations between assets and contingent claims
x 2 = 12 z 1 + 22 z 2 = z 2 ; (13)
Substituting into eqn. (2), we obtain the following relation between asset and contingent claim prices
Clearly, there is no way to …nd the unknown function p needed for both the functional form test (Proposition 1) and the local restrictions associated with the Slutsky equation (Proposition 2) in Section 4 below.
As the example illustrates, the di¢ culty in applying results derived in the contingent claim space to the asset space is that when markets are incomplete (J < S), p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p S cannot be uniquely recovered from asset prices based on eqn. (2) since there are S variables but only J independent equations. Without knowing (expressions for) contingent claim prices, it is not possible to conduct the contingent claim functional form or local demand tests for Expected Utility. We next show that it is possible to derive a candidate contingent claim price vector based on an Expected Utility representation by considering the e¤ects of varying probabilities on the inverse demands. Before stating our result, it will prove useful to consider the inverse demand function which maps asset demands, probabilities and income into a supporting price vector. Denote this function by q j (z 1 ; :::; z j ; 1 ; :::; S ; I) (j = 1; 2; :::; J).
4
It is easy to see that this function is well de…ned. For our analysis below, we require the partial derivatives of this 4 Since asset prices q are exogenously given and independent of income, it may seem strange that we state q(z; ;I). However it should be emphasized that the latter corresponds to inverse demands. (See footnote 3.) Indeed when we consider left hand side of eqn. (17), q denotes inverse demand and it will be a function of asset demands, probabilities and income. For the right hand side of (17), if x s is not proportional to I, (x s q j )=I will also be a function I. Therefore, contingent claim prices p will be a function of I as well.
function with respect to probabilities. It can be veri…ed that the derivative
where D q z and D z are respectively the Jacobian matrix of the asset demand partial derivatives with respect to asset prices and probabilities. Then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Given the asset demand functions z j ( 1 ; :::; S ; q 1 ; :::; q J ; I) (j = 1; :::; J) and the payo¤ matrix js J S , suppose that js xsq j I 6 = 0 for all j = 1; :::; J and all s = 1; :::; S. Then using the following set of equations 
(derived under the assumption that U in the optimization (1) takes the Expected Utility form (3)), one can construct a unique solution p(q; ;I) corresponding to the candidate set of contingent claim prices.
Remark 1 It should be emphasized that the S contingent claim prices constructed in Theorem 1 are not independent of each other in general since they are functions of the J asset prices, where J < S. This price dependence will also a¤ect the local demand test introduced in the next section.
Remark 2 In Example 2 below, we illustrate that the derivative conditions in Theorem 1 allow one to extend functional form test for Expected Utility preferences from complete to incomplete markets. Applying similar logic, it is relatively straightforward to show that for revealed preference tests of Expected Utility based on contingent claim demands, one can use an independent set of discrete demand, price and probability observations to play the role of eqn. (17) in Theorem 1 to pin down a candidate vector of contingent claim prices. While feasible, the informational demands are non-trivial and realistically could only be applied in a laboratory setting such as in the non-parametric asset demand tests of Choi, et al. (2007b) .
It follows immediately from the proof of Theorem 1 that the contingent claim prices p(q; ;I) obtained as a solution to eqns. (17) are dependent on the …rst order conditions of the optimization problem based on U taking the Expected Utility form (3). It is for this reason that they are referred to as candidate contingent claim prices.
The construction in the theorem implicitly de…nes the function p(q; ;I) whose existence is postulated in Proposition 1. Note that from its construction, we can directly obtain all of the partial derivatives of this function, D q; ;I p. The following example illustrates …rst how to use Theorem 1 to derive a unique set of contingent claim prices. Then these prices are used in the application of the incomplete markets k-test in Proposition 1 to verify that the given asset demands were generated as the result of an Expected Utility maximization.
Example 2 Return to Example 1. To …nd a unique set of contingent claim prices consistent with (15), we use the results from Theorem 1, where the inverse demand function is based on the assumption that the demands were generated as the result of Expected Utility maximization. Deriving the inverse asset demand functions from (10)-(11) yields
It follows from Theorem 1 that
It can be veri…ed that
where
Therefore, we have
After some messy algebra, it can be veri…ed that
Clearly the set of contingent claim prices (30) -(32) satisfy (15) and are uniquely determined based on the given asset prices and state probabilities.
Next to see that the given asset demands are consistent with the maximization of an Expected Utility function, consider the following relations between asset and contingent claim demands and prices
x 2 = 12 z 1 + 22 z 2 = z 2 ; (35)
It follows that
(42) It seems that one cannot express x 2 as a function of x 1 and 2 p 1 1 p 2 as required by the k-test in Proposition 1. However if we use the contingent claim price relations (30) - (32), it can be easily seen that
Then considering the relationship between x 1 and x 2 , we have
Similarly, the relationship between x 1 and x 3 is given by
5 To obtain the relation between x 1 and x 2 in eqn. (45), …rst solve for I as a function of x 1 (this is possible since contingent claims must be normal goods in an Expected Utility setting).
Next substitute for I in the x 2 demand function, yielding x 2 as a function of x 1 , q 1 , q 2 and probabilities. Using eqns. (30) and (31) to solve for q 1 and q 2 as functions of p 1 and p 2 , x 2 can be expressed as a function of x 1 , p 1 , p 2 and probabilities. we have
Thus, x s = k s x 1 and x s = x 1 when setting k s = 1 (s = 2; 3). Combining eqns. (45) and (48) with the budget constraint
yields the unique set of contingent claim demands
It can be easily veri…ed that this set of demands satis…es Slutsky symmetry and negative semide…niteness. Then it follows from Proposition 1 that the demands (10) and (11) are consistent with Expected Utility maximization where the contingent claims prices are given by (30) -(32).
Note that in Example 2, since p 1 , p 2 and p 3 are not independent, (p 1 ; p 2 ; p 3 ) cannot take any value in R 3 ++ . It follows from eqns. (43), (46) and (48) that
which corresponds to a surface in R 3 ++ . This is shown in Figure 1 , where it is assumed that ( 1 ; 2 ; 3 ) = (0:5; 0:3; 0:2) : Similarly, x 1 , x 2 and x 3 are not independent of each other and it follows from eqns.
(34) -(36) that
implying that optimal demands can only occur on this plane. In Figure 2 (a), we show the budget plane and the plane corresponding to x 3 = 1 2 (x 1 + x 2 ). These two planes intersect in a line and the optimal demand vector must lie on this line. In Figure 2 (b), this line is seen to be tangent to the Expected Utility indi¤erence surface at the optimal demands.
As the reader has probably already surmised from eqn. (50), the quite complex asset demands (10) and (11) can be rationalized by the following familiar Expected Utility
If one considers the contingent claim space, the Expected Utility is given by
However, we cannot conclude that (55) holds in the full contingent claim space in contrast to the representation (54), which holds in the full asset space, since the contingent claim demands x 1 , x 2 and x 3 are not independent. For Example 2, x 3 = 1 2 (x 1 + x 2 ). Therefore, in the contingent claim setting, we can only conclude that the preferences corresponding to the asset demands (10) and (11) are Expected Utility representable in the subspace x 1 ; x 2 ; 1 2 (x 1 + x 2 ) . Outside this subspace, we do not know what the preferences are due to the lack of information in the incomplete market case. With respect to the axiom system derived in Kubler, Selden and Wei (2015) , we can also only conclude that the axioms for Expected Utility hold for this contingent claim subspace. This issue is also pointed out in Proposition 2 in Polemarchakis and Selden (1981) . They argue that since markets are incomplete, there could be other non-Expected Utility functions over contingent claims that generate the same asset demands. With respect to Example 2, consider the following utility function
which is not an Expected Utility function. However, using eqns. (34) - (36),
implying that
Therefore, the non-Expected Utility function (56) generates the same asset demands (10) and (11) as the Expected Utility function (55).
Local Demand Test
In this section by again using the insight of Green and Srivastava to simply postulate the existence of contingent claim prices that satisfy the no-arbitrage condition and support observed contingent claim demand, we show that it is possible to develop a local demand test for Expected Utility in incomplete markets. From Theorem 1 we obtain the function p s (q; ; I) that maps asset prices, probabilities and income to contingent claim prices. For the complete markets problem, the Slutsky equation is given by
De…ne
where the symmetric and negative de…nite matrix = ( ij ) S S has rank S 1 with p = 0. When markets are incomplete, p i and p j are not independent. Therefore, we cannot calculate D p x directly to obtain ij . However by the chain rule of di¤erentiation we obtain that contingent claim demand as a function of q, and I, 
has to satisfy
Noting that
eqns. (64) - (65) can be also rewritten as
Given asset demand, we can calculate D q x, D q; ;I p as well as D I x and D x. Therefore in eqns. (63), (67) and (68), we have S 2 unknowns corresponding to the di¤erent ij (not imposing symmetry of the Slutsky matrix yet) and S 2 unknowns corresponding to the di¤erent ij as well as S unknowns corresponding to the derivatives i . Since we only have SJ + S + S 2 linear equations it seems that it is impossible to determine the unknowns. However, the assumption of Expected Utility reduces the number of unknowns substantially. The following result then extends Theorem 3 from Kubler, Selden and Wei (2014) to incomplete markets. 
The application of this proposition is illustrated by the following example.
Example 3 Assume that the demand functions are given by (10) and (11). It follows from Example 2 that
(75) Since contingent claim prices do not depend on I, eqn. (67) becomes
implying that i can be directly solved for from the above equation. Therefore, we only need to solve for ( ij ) 3 3 , which involves 9 unknowns. First combining eqn.
(68) with eqn. (70) yields
which is made up of 9 equations, but there are only 6 independent equations. Moreover, eqn. (63) becomes
@p s @q j x s i 8i 2 f1; 2; 3g ; j 2 f1; 2g ;
which corresponds to 6 equations. But it can be veri…ed that these 6 equations are all linearly dependent on the the 6 independent equations in (77) above and thus do not provide any new information. It can be also veri…ed that the singularity equations 3 X s=1 is p s = 0 8i 2 f1; 2; 3g (79)
are not independent equations either. The 3 symmetry equations ij = ji 8i 6 = j 2 f1; 2; 3g (80)
provide 2 more independent equations. Finally, Equation (69) 
Conclusion
In this paper, we develop functional form and local demand tests for Expected Utility. Although not much work has been done seeking to develop similar tests for non-Expected Utility representations, this would seem to be a promising area for future research. Assuming complete market tests can be derived for these utilities, it may be possible to extend them to incomplete markets by applying analogous versions of Theorem 1. One particularly straightforward case is that of Prospect Theory associated with the representation 6 U (x 1 ; ::; x S ; 1 ; ::
Assume one is given the asset demand functions z j ( 1 ; :::; S ; q 1 ; :::; q J ; I) (j = 1; :::; J) and the payo¤ matrix js J S . Suppose that js xsq j I 6 = 0 for all j = 1; :::; J and all s = 1; :::; S. Then analogous to (17) in Theorem 1 one can show that the following set of equations has a unique solution corresponding to the candidate set of contingent prices for the representation (92) 
where is the Lagrange multiplier. Given the inverse demand function q j ( 1 ; :::; S ; z 1 ; :::; z J ; I), di¤erentiating eqn. (97) with respect to s (s 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg), one obtains
Di¤erentiating the budget constraint with respect to s (s 2 f1; :::; Sg), it follows that
Combining eqn. (98) with (99) yields
Substituting the above equation into (98) one obtains
or equivalently @q j @ s = js x s q j I u 0 (x s ) :
De…ning p s = su 0 (xs) , we obtain eqn. (17). Since eqns. (17) consist of S independent linear equations in (p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p S ), one can always …nd a unique solution.
Proof of Proposition 2
It follows from Kubler, Selden and Wei (2014, Theorem 3) that the contingent claim demands can be rationalized by a state independent Expected Utility function (3) if and only if is symmetric and negative semide…nite and ; ; satisfy eqns. (69), (70) and (71). Moreover, the asset demands are consistent with the contingent claim demands if and only if eqns. (63), (67) and (68) hold. Therefore, asset demands can be rationalized by a state independent Expected Utility function (3) if and only if there exists a solution f ; ; g such that is symmetric and negative semide…nite and eqns. (63), (67), (68), (69), (70) and (71) hold.
